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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
·CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-Comm.erce Clause-1966 
Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act 
Extending Coverage to Employees in 
State-Operated Schools, Hospitals, and 
Related Institutions Held Constitutional 
-Maryland v. Wirtz* 
In 1966, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act1 
(FLSA) and for the first time extended the coverage of the minimum 
wage and overtime provisions to employees in state-operated schools, 
hospitals, and related institutions.2 The State of Maryland, joined by 
twenty-seven other states,3 brought an action to enjoin enforcement 
of the amendments insofar as they applied to these state-operated 
facilities and sought a declaratory judgment ruling the amendments 
unconstitutional. The states asserted that the amendments were un-
constitutional in two respects. First, they contended that the "enter-
prise" concept of FLSA coverage, which extended the Act to cover 
all employees of an "enterprise" if some of those employees were 
"engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,"4 
was an invalid exercise of congressional power under the commerce 
clause.5 Second, the states made the two-pronged assertion that their 
" 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Oct. 19, 
1967), jurisdiction on appeal to the United States Supreme Court noted, CCH LAB. 
L. REP. (1 WAGES AND HoURS) at 35,492 Gan. 15, 1968) (hereinafter cited as the 
principal case]. For a detailed analysis of the judges' opinions in the principal case, 
see Recent Decision, A Balancing Test for the Commerce Power?, 56 G1::o. L.J. 392 
(1968); Comment, Constitutional Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-1966 Amendments 
Extending Coverage to Certain Employees of State Public Schools, Hospitals, and 
Related Institutions Held Constitutional, 43 Nonu: DAME LAw. 414 (1968). 
1. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-19 (1964). 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-18 (Supp. II, 1967), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964). Section 
203(r) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as amended extends coverage to em-
ployees of enterprises operating suburban or interurban electric railways and local 
trolley or motorbus carriers, whether public or private, as well as to employees of 
schools, hospitals, and related institutions. However, the states limited their challenge 
to the inclusion of the employees of public schools, hospitals, and related institutions. 
Undoubtedly, the states followed this course in order to avoid strong past precedent 
upholding federal regulation of state-operated railways. See notes 52-55 infra and 
accompanying text. 
3. Along with Maryland, the following states and their political subdivisions inter-
vened as parties plaintiff under FED. R. Crv. P. 24: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Wyoming. In addition, the Fort Worth, Texas Independent School District joined in 
the action. Amicus curiae briefs in support of the Secretary of Labor were filed by 
the AFL-CIO and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 
AFL-CIO. 
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r) &: (s) (Supp. II, 1967) (quoted at notes 14-15 infra). 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To Regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes •••• " 
[750] 
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activities in operating schools and hospitals are entirely outside the 
scope of the congressional power to regulate commerce, 6 and, alter-
natively, that, even if their activities could be considered within the 
scope of that power, the application of federal wage and hour regu-
lation interferes with the states' performance of their sovereign func-
tions and thus violates the basic federal scheme of the Constitution 
as declared by the tenth amendment.7 A three-judge federal district 
court8 denied the injunction, holding that Congress did not exceed 
its power by applying the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA to 
employees in state-operated schools and hospitals, and that the "en-
terprise" concept of coverage is not itself an unconstitutional exten-
sion of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.9 
Prior to 1961, the FLSA did not extend to "enterprises" but cov-
ered only individual employees in private businesses who were per-
sonally "engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce."10 Each individual employee had to fall within 
this standard to be covered;11 thus, it was theoretically possible for 
6. Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 13-22. 
7. Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 28-48. The states admitted that the 
tenth amendment operates merely as a declaration of the relationship between the 
federal and state governments [United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)] and thus 
does not bar a congressional exercise of a granted power over state activities inci-
dentally falling within the scope of such regulation [see, e.g., Parden v. Terminal R.R. 
of Alabama Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)]. Nevertheless, they argued that if the 
tenth amendment is to have any meaning at all, it must limit congressional power 
to the extent of preventing Congress from enacting measures destructive of our federal 
system of government under the guise of regulating interstate commerce. Brief for 
the Plaintiff State of Maryland at 48-49a. 
8. The three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964), which pro-
vides that an application for a permanent or interlocutory injunction restraining the 
enforcement, operation, or execution of a congressional act must be heard and deter-
mined by a district court composed of three judges. 
9. After the decision by the district court, the states secured an extension of the 
temporary restraining order issued at the commencement of the suit so as to enjoin 
enforcement of the FLSA until the states could prosecute a direct appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964). The case has been docketed 
and is now pending before the Supreme Court. 36 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1967), 
jurisdiction on appeal to the Supreme Court noted, CCH LAB. L. REP. (1 WAGES AND 
HOURS) a 35,492 (Jan. 15, 1968). 
10. Employees of states and their political subdivisions were expressly excluded 
prior to 1961. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1964). Congress gave no express reason for providing 
this exclusion for state employees. Apparently it did so in order to avoid any possible 
constitutional problems. Thus, during hearings on the proposed statute, Attorney 
General Jackson testified that "there is a constitutional problem involved the moment 
the Federal Government attempts to regulate anything that a State ••• does in refer-
ence to its employees." Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm. 
on Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 82 (1937). 
11. Because the statutory language was framed in terms of an employee's "engaging 
in commerce," the Supreme Court held in a series of pre-1961 cases that the fact that 
an employee "affected commerce" was not sufficient to bring him within the statutory 
coverage of the FLSA. For an excellent review of these decisions, see Goldberg v. Wade 
Lahar Constr. Co., 290 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 427 (1961). 
Although something more than merely "affecting" commerce was required, direct 
contact with interstate commerce was not essential to coverage of an employee; it was 
considered sufficient if the activity engaged in by the employee was "in proximity to 
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the Act to cover only a fraction of the employees of a given business. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Act's standard of cov-
erage in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.12 on the grounds that 
"an employee's engagement in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce" is one of "those activities intra-state which so 
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress 
over it, as to make the regulation of them appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end .... "13 
commerce" [Mitchell v. H. B. Zachery Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960)] or so closely related 
to commerce as to be capable of being considered a part thereof. Mitchell v. Vollmer 
& Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955). Because the application of the FLSA was thus completely 
dependent upon the nature of the employee's activities and not upon the character 
of the employer's business, the fact that an employer was engaged in commerce or 
was even affecting commerce did not mean that all his employees were necessarily 
covered by the FLSA. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); 
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942). 
12. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
13. 312 U.S. at 118. In upholding the original FI.SA as a valid exercise of the 
commerce power, the Court specifically overruled its prior decision in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). It held that the power to regulate interstate com-
merce and those intrastate activities having a "substantial effect" on interstate com-
merce includes the power to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods produced in 
violation of the FLSA. Prior to Hammer, charges that wage and hour regulation ex-
ceeded the limits of the commerce power, violated the fifth amendment, and invaded 
the reserved powers of the states were sufficient to invalidate federal wage-hour legis-
lation. Although it was recognized that the federal government, the states, and mu-
nicipalities could constitutionally regulate wage rates for persons employed on public 
work so long as the requirements of certainty and reasonableness had been met [see 
cases cited in Annots., 50 A.L.R. 1480 (1927); 132 A.L.R. 1297 (1941)], the Supreme 
Court persisted in frustrating legislative policy. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding a congressional statute which gave a minimum wage 
board the power to fix minimum wages for women in the District of Columbia 
violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 379 (1918) (holding the Federal Child Labor Law of 1916 unconstitutional 
on the grounds that the commerce clause did not empower Congress to exclude prod-
ucts from interstate commerce unless the articles in question were inherently danger-
ous). See also Annot., 90 A.L.R. 814 (1934), for a detailed analysis of earlier cases 
recognizing the validity of statutes limiting only the hours of labor in private industry. 
The following pre-Darby articles are of interest in regard to the historical develop-
ment of the wage and hour law: Symposium-The Wage and Hour Law, 6 I.Aw & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 321 (1939); Note, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 39 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 818 (1939); Comment, The Federal Wages and Hours Act, 52 HARV. L. REv. 
646 (1939); Note, Constitutional Aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 87 
U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1938). 
Subsequently, the Adkins case was overruled by the Supreme Court in West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the Court upheld a Washington statute 
setting minimum wages for women. The West Coast Hotel case, together with the 
overruling of Hammer v. Dagenhart in Darby, evinced a marked change in judicial 
attitude, which in turn opened the door for the far-reaching wage and hour statutes 
thereafter enacted by both Congress and the states. This subsequent development is 
analyzed in Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 740 (1955). Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected 
contentions that the FLSA constitutes an improper delegation of legislative powers 
[Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941)], an infringement of 
freedom of the press [Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)], 
an authorization of unreasonable searches and seizures [Oklahoma Press Publishing 
Co. v. Walling, supra] and a law which provides arbitrary and discriminatory bases 
for exemption [Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946)]. 
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The 1961 amendments significantly expanded the original cover-
age of the Act by introducing the "enterprise" concept.14 Congress 
defined a regulated enterprise not as a business unit that "affects 
commerce," but instead as one "which has employees engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . .''15 This 
language has been administratively interpreted to mean that an en-
terprise which has more than one employee engaged in commerce 
can be brought within the coverage of the Act.16 Once an enterprise 
is brought within the ambit of the Act, all of its employees are cov-
ered by the regulatory provisions. The states in the principal case 
claimed that this was an unconstitutional extension of the commerce 
power because it may extend coverage to employees who have no 
connection with interstate commerce other than the fact that two 
of their fellow employees are engaged in commerce.17 
Although two other courts had previously been presented with 
this problem,18 the court in the principal case was the first court to 
make a conclusive determination of the constitutionality of the en-
terprise concept and to present cogent reasons for its holding. In 
validating the new coverage, the court relied mainly on the similarity 
between the regulation of an enterprise in the context of the FLSA 
and the regulation of an employer under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).19 Under section 10 of the NLRA,20 the National 
14. "Enterprise" is defined in § 203(r) as follows: 
"Enterprise" means the related activities performed (either through unified opera-
tion or common control) by any person or persons for a common business pur-
pose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more estab• 
lishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including 
departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but 
shall not include related activities performed by such enterprise by an independent 
contractor. . • • 
29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1964). 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964). 
16. CCH LAB. L. REP. (I WAGES&: HoURS) 1 25,185 (1967). 
17. See Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 26-27. Some legislators raised this 
question of constitutionality during discussions of the 1961 and 1966 amendments 
[S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1961); 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. &: AD. NEWS 1689-94 
(1961)], but apparently their objections were not considered serious. 
18. Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242 F. Supp. I (D.S.C. 1965) (holding that dairy 
products purchasers, producers, and distributors constituted an enterprise engaged 
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA and that retail route helpers, 
not being otherwise exempt, were covered by the minimum wage and overtime pro-
visions); Goldberg v. Ed's Shopworth Supermarket, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 781 (D. La. 1963) 
(holding that a retail grocery store was within the provisions of the FLSA by virtue 
of its receipt of a sufficient volume of goods which had travelled in interstate com-
merce). In neither of these cases did the courts make a conclusive determination of 
the constitutionality of the "enterprise" concept. They merely concluded that the 
defendants had failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Rejection of 
the claims of invalidity was based upon the failure of the defendants to show that 
the employees held to have been covered did not affect commerce; it was not based 
upon a broad approval of the enterprise concept. The court in the principal case 
converted these inconclusive decisions into authoritative precedent. 
19. Principal case at 836. 
20. 29 u.s.c. § 160 (1964). 
754 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66 
Labor Relations Board has been given jurisdiction over labor dis-
putes which "affect commerce" and thus has been vested with the 
fullest jurisdiction constitutionally permissible under the commerce 
clause.21 Existing precedents under the NLRA hold that Congress 
has the power to regulate the labor relations of local businesses which 
directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce whether or not 
individual employees affect commerce.22 The court found that Con-
gress could similarly regulate the wages and hours of employees with-
out regard to whether the employees themselves directly engage in 
interstate commerce. However, this analogy seems somewhat inap-
propriate because the statutory basis of coverage under the NLRA 
is the effect that the disruption of the employment relationship 
might have on interstate commerce. To determine whether the req-
uisite effect exists in NLRA cases courts often refer to the volume of 
the employer's interstate business which is, or might be, withdrawn 
from interstate commerce as a result of a strike or other interfer-
ence.23 In adopting the 1961 amendments, Congress did not base the 
extended coverage of the FLSA on the fact that the employment re-
lationship "affected commerce"; rather it focused upon the connec-
tion of individual employees with interstate commerce as the deter-
minant of whether an enterprise falls within the Act. It is the con-
nection of two or more employees engaged in interstate commerce 
21. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963). Similarly, the FLSA was 
designed to cope with substandard labor conditions which "lead to labor disputes." 
29 u.s.c. § 202 (1964). 
22. In many cases arising under the NLRA, the Supreme Court has sustained NLRB 
jurisdiction over a particular employer or an entire labor dispute found to affect 
commerce even though individual employees or isolated incidents did not meet the 
test. For example, in NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963), the Court 
upheld NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices committed by a retail distrib• 
utor of fuel oil, where the retailer had obtained the oil from a wholesaler who brought 
it in from another state. See also Plumbers Union v. Door County, 359 U.S. 354 
(1958); Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 483 (1953); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 
(1944). Under these rulings, the NLRB is deemed to have jurisdiction to regulate the 
acts of the employer toward each of his employees without regard to whether the 
employee himself has satisfied the requisite jurisdictional test. All of the employer's 
employment relationships are thus subject to regulation so long as his business affects 
commerce. 
23. Jurisdiction of the NLRB has repeatedly been sustained even in cases where 
the amount of out-of-state goods used by the local businesses was strikingly small in 
value. See, e.g., United States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 
U.S. 942 (1966) (jurisdiction over superintendents of small apartment buildings which 
annually spent from $1,200 to $4,500 for fuel originating out of state upheld); 
NLRB v. Inglewood Park Cemetery Ass'n, 355 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1966) (jurisdiction 
over operation of a cemetery which expended $3,000 on out-of-state purchases during 
one year upheld); NLRB v. Aurora City Lines, Inc., 299 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1962) (juris• 
diction sustained over the operation of a local bus company which locally purchased 
$2,000 worth of materials originating outside the state); NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 
305 (9th Cir. 1953) (jurisdiction over operation of dry cleaning establishment which 
annually purchased some $12,000 worth of soap, cleaning solvent, and paper originat• 
ing out-of-state upheld.) 
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which establishes whether an enterprise is covered, and not the vol-
ume of interstate goods sent or received by the business unit.24 As 
mentioned, once an enterprise is found to be covered, all the em-
ployees in that enterprise are subject to the provisions of the Act 
whether or not they would be individually covered.215 
Putting aside the NLRA analogy, it seems doubtful that an 
"enterprise" satisfies the constitutional standard of "affecting com-
merce" merely because two of its employees are "engaged" in com-
merce, despite the far-reaching decisions extending the scope of the 
commerce power.26 Indeed, one court has expressed such a doubt: 
[I]n considering the fact that [the definition of "enterprise" in the 
FLSA] sets no standard for the number of employees who must be 
engaged in interstate commerce before an enterprise is deemed to 
engage in interstate commerce, it appears that the statute does go 
far towards invading the field of intrastate commerce where the 
provisions of the Act should not be effective.27 
The discussion above assumes that "enterprise" means a business 
unit taken as a whole. It may be possible to avoid the constitutional 
problems, however, by viewing "enterprise" as a term of art mean-
ing something less than the entire business unit. The Act defines 
"enterprise" as follows: " 'Enterprise' means the related activities per-
formed (either through unified operation or common control) by any 
person or persons for a common business purpose . . . .''28 And, a 
covered enterprise is, of course, one "which has employees engaged 
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce."29 It is 
possible to argue that "related activities ... for a common business 
purpose" may refer to less than the entire business unit in some in-
stances. For example, in a business in which some employees are 
24. See text accompanying notes 15 &: 16 supra. It should be noted that § 203(s) 
provides that certain enterprises must meet specified "dollar-tests." These provisions 
merely impose a limit on the coverage of the FLSA once it is determined that the 
enterprise falls under FLSA's commerce test. The individual employee's connection 
with interstate commerce is the key to determining enterprise coverage which is then 
limited by the dollar volume of the business. 
25. See generally BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE NEW "WAGE AND HOUR I.Aw 
(1961); CCH LAB. L. REP. (1 WAGES &: HOURS) 1[ 25,185 (1967) for definitive treatments 
of the 1961 amendments and their application. The following legislative reports deal 
with the scope of the amendments: S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 
REP. No. 75, 87th Cong, 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 327, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) 
(Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3935). 
26. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942). Wickard v. Filburn, where 
the Court held that a farmer's consumption of wheat raised on his own farm sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce so as to bring him within the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, represents one of the most extreme examples of the reach of the 
commerce power. 
27. Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242 F. Supp. I, 5 (D.S.C. 1965). 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 20!1(r) (1964); see note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 20!1(r) &: (s) (1964); see notes 15 &: 16 supra and accompanying text. 
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"engaged in commerce," an enterprise may be comprised only of 
these employees plus other employees of the business whose activities 
are "related" to those of the employees engaged in commerce.30 In 
such a situation, the "related" employees may well be said to be en-
gaged in activities which "affect commerce," albeit indirectly. Their 
work, after all, is necessary to the successful performance of jobs by 
employees engaged in commerce; should they cease working, the 
work of the employees engaged in commerce might be rendered 
either more difficult or nugatory.31 Under this narrowed definition 
of "enterprise," FLSA coverage could be sustained as a matter of 
constitutional principle, since every employee in the "enterprise" by 
definition "affects" commerce by virtue of his relation to those en-
gaged in commerce. In most cases, all employees in a business unit 
would be included in the FLSA "enterprise" because they would be 
performing activities related to those of the employees engaged in 
commerce. In those rare cases where employees in a business unit 
might not be sufficiently related to those engaged in commerce, they 
would not be in the "enterprise" and hence not covered. Thus, it 
would be impossible for an employee who does not affect commerce 
to be regulated, and the states' contention that it might be possible 
would be clearly without merit. 
Although the "enterprise" concept may be considered consti-
tutionally valid under a proper construction of the statute, there 
still remains the more troublesome and more fundamental problem 
of whether Congress has the power to extend the coverage of the 
FLSA, or any other regulatory scheme enacted under the commerce 
clause, to public schools, hospitals, or other state activities. In the 
1966 amendments, Congress specifically included such state-operated 
institutions as "enterprises," thus bringing these theretofore excluded 
activities within the wage and hour provisions,32 and for the first 
30. For an interpretation of what constitutes "related activities" under § 203(r), see 
CCH LAB. L. REP. (1 WAGES & HoURS) ~ 25,185 (1967). 
31. This approach seems to be supported by, although not expressly set forth in, 
an example given by Judge Winter in the principal case at 836: 
It is a matter of elementary logic that the hospital and the school function as 
a result of the sum of all of the activities of all of their employees. The hospital 
administrator or the superintendent of education (himself exempt from the pro-
visions of the Act), or his secretary, or some other employees, would have no 
occasion to engage in commerce, or the production of goods in commerce, if the 
services of the employees covered by the Act under the 1966 Amendments were 
permanently withdrawn. Their services are essential to the operation of the hos-
pital or the school and, hence, their activities, although local in nature, substan-
tially affect commerce, so that Congress may regulate the minimum wages to be 
paid them as well as the maximum hours they may be required to work without 
payment of overtime. 
Such an approach is in accordance with prior Supreme Court decisions that congres-
sional power over commerce extends to employees whose activities are related to but 
not directly part of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 
684 (1945); Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944). 
32. This result was accomplished by the amendment of the statutory definition of 
"employer" to eliminate the existing exclusion of states and their political subdivisions 
February 1968] Recent Developments 757 
time attempting directly to regulate a state activity by federal legis-
lation.33 In the principal case, two of the three judges on the panel 
held the application of the minimum wage provisions to state activ-
ities constitutional, although each of the three judges took a dif-
ferent position on the validity of the extension of the overtime pro-
so far as they engaged in the operation of schools, hospitals, and related institutions. 
29 U.S.C § 203(d) (Supp. II, 1967). The definitions of "enterprise" and "enterprise 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" were accordingly 
modified. They extend enterprise coverage to hospitals, nursing homes, and schools, 
regardless of whether public or private or whether operated for profit or not for 
profit, where the requisite commerce test is met, that is, where the enterprise has 
"employees engaged in commerce, in the production of goods for commerce, or in han-
dling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced 
for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) &: (s) (Supp. II, 1967). See note 25 supra and accom-
panying text. The amendments did not, however, purport to bring all employees of 
state-operated enterprises within the FLSA. Rather they extended the white collar 
exemption so as to exclude from coverage executive, administrative, and professional 
employees, such as teachers and academic administrative personnel. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) 
(Supp. II, 1967). In addition, certain partial exemptions to the overtime provisions 
were given to hospitals and nursing homes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207G), 213 (Supp. II, 1967). 
The apparent impetus to the enactment of the 1966 amendments was the desire 
of Congress to broaden coverage of the FLSA in response to presidential recommen-
dation. U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS 9 (1965); PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, Ill CONG. REc. 1402 (1965); SPECIAL MEssAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, Ill CONG. 
REc. 10,399 (1965). The congressional committee reports reveal that of the 60 million 
wage and salary workers in the United States, including some 9.5 million public em-
ployees, less than half were covered by the existing law. H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7 (1966); S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966). The effect 
of the 1966 amendments was to protect an additional 5.8 million private employees 
and 1.4 million public employees. The added coverage for public schools, hospitals 
and related institutions, and local transit systems was provided on the basis of con-
gressional belief that employees of such enterprises are as much in need of a mini-
mum standard of living as workers employed in private industry and that in several 
areas public employees were not receiving sufficient compensation to enable them to 
maintain such a standard. See 112 CONG. REc. 10,820-21 (daily ed. May 5, 1966); Hear-
ings on H.R. 8259 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
pt. I, at 429-30, 449, 455 (1955), 
33. It has been the traditional congressional policy to exclude state employees 
engaged in certain state activities from the coverage of legislation embodying social 
welfare objectives. See, e.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 
3306(c)(7) (1964); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 152(2) (1964); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e{b) (1964). In addition, social security 
legislation excludes the states as covered employers. 26 U.S.C. § 312I(b)(7) (1964); 42 
U.S.C, § 410(a)(7) (1964). 
However, in 1942 an organ of the federal government-the National War Labor 
Board-did consider the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to oversee labor disputes 
between state employees and their governmental employers, and determined that no 
jurisdiction existed. National War Labor Board, Cases Nos. 47, 726 (Dec. 23, 1942), 
reported in c. H. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAw 226 (1946). 
The decision was based on the notion that a state has undisputed power to regulate 
the working hours and compensation of its employees: "[A]ny directive order of 
the National '\Var Labor Board which purported to regulate the wages, working 
hours, or the conditions of employment of state or municipal employees would con-
stitute a clear invasion of the sovereign rights of the political subdivisions of local 
state government." It is noteworthy that this decision was reached after the decisions 
in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and NLRB v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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visions to these state activities.34 Since the decision in the principal 
case adds judicial sanction to direct federal control over state func-
tions, it assumes landmark proportions. The implications of the 
decision may well signal the need for a reinterpretation of the scope 
of Congress' power under the commerce clause.35 
The plaintiff states initially argued that the operation of public 
schools and hospitals is purely "local" and hence not "interstate 
commerce" within the meaning of the commerce clause.36 However, 
despite popular thinking which views schools and hospitals as carry-
ing on activities peculiarly "local" in nature, the "interstate" nature 
of such activities can be easily demonstrated. There can be little 
doubt that school and hospital expenditures for supplies and equip-
ment generate a substantial fl.ow of goods in interstate commerce.31 
34. Judge Winter deemed the amendments constitutional both as to the minimum 
wage and the overtime provisions on the theory that the operation of schools and 
hospitals exerted a substantial effect upon interstate commerce and thus was within 
the reach of the federal commerce power. Principal case at 832, 836-37. Chief Judge 
Thomsen, concurring in the result as to the minimum wage provisions, conceded 
that the operation of schools and hospitals by the states may affect interstate com-
merce to a substantial degree; nevertheless, he went on to rest his decision upon the 
theory that an application of the Fl.SA to the states did not "seriously interfere with 
the state's performance or regulation of its indispensable sovereigu functions." Prin-
cipal case at 850. Applying this latter test to the overtime provisions, however, Judge 
Thomsen concluded that they "probably" go beyond constitutionally permissible 
limits with respect to some if not all of the covered employees. He would have per-
mitted the states to challenge the overtime provisions on a case-by-case basis, thus 
allowing the court in each case to determine if impermissible undue interference 
with sovereign state functions existed. Principal case at 851-52. A similar "undue 
interference" test was utilized by Judge Northrop in reaching the conclusion that 
the extension of both the minimum wage and overtime provisions to the states is 
unconstitutional. Principal case at 852-53. As a result of this division in the court, 
the reasoning of the concurring and dissenting opinions, while not leading to the 
same result, actually constitutes the majority rationale. See generally Recent Decision, 
A Balancing Test for the Commerce Power?, 56 GEO. L.J. 392 (1968); Comment, Con-
stitutional Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-1966 Amendments Extending Coverage 
to Certain Employees of State Public Schools, Hospitals, and Related Institutions Held 
Constitutional, 43 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 414 (1968). 
35. Although the principal case is the first case in which a court has been squarely 
presented with express regulation of the states under the commerce clause, considera-
tion of the problem of intergovernmental immunity as a limitation on the exercise of 
federal powers other than the taxing power is by no means new. See cases cited in 
note 43 infra. See also Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Intergovernmental Im-
munities-Statutory Construction-Applicability of Price Control Legislation to Sales 
by States, 45 MICH. L. REv. 94 (1946) (noting Case v. Bowles); Note, State Sovereignty 
as a Limitation Upon the Federal Commerce Power, 45 YALE L.J. 1118 (1936) (noting 
United States v. California). 
36. Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 13-22. 
37. During fiscal year 1967 an estimated $38.3 billion was spent by the nation's 
state and local public educational and medical institutions. In fiscal year 1965 state 
and local authorities spent some $3.9 billion in the operation of public hospitals. 
The stipulations of the plaintiff states indicate that substantial portions of these 
amounts are expended to purchase supplies and equipment in the interstate market. 
Thus, in Maryland, 87% of the $8 million spent in 1965 for supplies and equipment 
for use in the public schools involved direct interstate purchases, and over 55% of its 
hospital purchases were for out-of-state goods, In Ohio 42% of the total of $9 million 
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Thus, all three judges in the principal case agreed that state opera-
tion of schools and hospitals "affected" commerce and could be regu-
lated under the commerce power as traditionally defined.88 One 
spent by Ohio's six state universities on certain supplies during 1966 were purchased 
directly out of state, and an undetermined portion had been manufactured out of 
state. Information provided by Texas similarly shows that almost all textbooks origi-
nate outside of the state, and that "the major portion" of drugs and hospital equip-
ment is either purchased directly from out-of-state concerns, or at least manufactured 
in other states. It is noteworthy that the interstate flow of school and hospital supplies 
is necessitated by the limited geographical distribution of manufacturers of such goods. 
There are, for example, no Maryland suppliers for fourteen out of eighteen major 
categories of school supplies and equipment, including textbooks, teaching tools and 
audio-visual aids, science equipment, and physical education equipment. Even some 
of the larger states, such as Ohio and Texas, have few producers of such essential 
commodities. Principal case at 833-34; Reply Brief of Defendant at 2-4; Brief of the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees as Amicus Curiae 
at 3-4. 
In addition, it is well established that actual shipment of goods across state lines 
is "interstate" and not "local," and it has been held that goods so shipped need not 
be tangible, but can consist of "ideas, wishes, orders and intelligence." Western Union 
v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945). Under this concept, the preparation of written docu-
ments and other materials for out-of-state transmission, as well as the actual trans-
mission of funds, documents and other communications, seemingly can be classified 
as "interstate commerce." Several cases in fact have held that employees engaged in 
the preparation of written documents and other materials for interstate transmission 
or in the actual interstate transmission of such documents, communications, and funds 
are within the coverage of the FLSA. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 
F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1965); Willmark Service System, Inc. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 486 (8th 
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897 (1963); Public Bldg. Authority v. Goldberg, 298 
F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. Kroger Co., 248 F.2d 935 (8th Cir. 1957); Aetna 
Fin. Co. v. Mitchell, 247 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1957). 
Applying these concepts to state-operated schools and hospitals, Judge Winter 
reasoned that the preparation and exchange of documents in connection with various 
federal aid programs is sufficient to support a finding that "public schools and hos-
pitals are directly engaged in commerce and the production of goods for commerce." 
Principal case at 834. The significance of the notion that the mere interchange of 
communications with the federal government is sufficient to put one "in commerce" 
is readily apparent. If that is the rule it can well be wondered what, if anything, is 
not interstate commerce. 
38. See note 34 supra. The traditional bounds of congressional power under the 
commerce clause have undergone comprehensive treatment by other authorities and 
will not be re-considered here. See, e.g., Barnett, Ten Years of the Supreme Co~rt: 
1937-1947-Power To Regulate Commerce, 41 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 1170 (1947); Fallon, 
The Commerce Clause From the Schechter Case Through the 1944-45 Term, 19 TEMP. 
L.Q. 421 (1946); Green, Some Heretical Remarks on the Federal Power Over Com-
merce, 31 MINN. L. R.Ev. 121 (1947); Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. 
REv. 717 (1963); Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 645, 883 (1946). It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the battle 
over the power of Congress to regulate activities "affecting" commerce, which cul-
minated in the decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), was fought almost 
exclusively between the states and the federal government insofar as each claimed 
the power to regulate particular private activities. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones 8: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
Under the "substantial effect" test developed in these early cases, any activity which 
"substantially" affects or burdens interstate commerce may be regulated even though the 
activity itself is considered "local" in nature and even though the effect of a particular 
individual engaging in the activity is trivial. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Whether the effect of the activity is 
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judge, having arrived at this conclusion, said that the inquiry need 
go no further since the congressional power under the commerce 
clause is "plenary," and the regulation of any activity, including 
that of a state, which affects commerce is constitutional.39 However, 
the concurring and dissenting judges argued that in spite of the fact 
that the Supreme Court has yet to distinguish governmental from 
private activity in defining the scope of the commerce power, 40 the 
constitutional inquiry should not stop with a mechanistic appli-
cation of the "substantial effect" test; a perfunctory recital of the 
"direct" or "indirect" is immaterial so long as the effect is "substantial." NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. Furthermore, the particular activity need not 
be "commercial" or conducted for profit. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Powell v. United States Cartage Co., 339 U.S. 
497 (1950); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Brooks v. United States, 267 
U.S. 432 (1925). 
Only a handful of cases involved issues arising from the fact that state operations 
came within the regulatory ambit of a generally applicable federal commerce statute. 
See cases cited in note 43 infra. These cases are more fully analyzed hereinafter in 
connection with their value as precedent for sustaining the 1966 amendments. See 
notes 43-58 infra and accompanying text. 
Although it is thus evident that, through their operation of schools and hospitals, 
the states "affect commerce," it is not so clear how, through noncompliance with the 
federal minimum wage or maximum hour standards, state operation of schools, hos-
pitals, mental institutions, reformatories, and so forth, would constitute "unfair meth-
ods of competition" which "burden commerce and the free flow of goods in com-
merce"; cause the channels of commerce to be used to "spread and perpetuate 
substandard labor conditions"; lead to labor disputes; or "interfere with the orderly 
and fair marketing of goods in commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 202 (Supp. II, 1967). See Brief 
for Plaintiff State of Texas at 24; Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement in the United 
States Supreme Court at 27-29. 
39. Judge Winter, principal case at 832. Judge Winter explicitly rejected the notion 
that the nature of our federal system imposes any limitation on Congress' power 
under the commerce clause: "The specific and peremptory rejection of the argument 
that the principle of duality in our system of government may limit in any way the 
authority of Congress to regulate commerce is dispositive of the present case." Prin-
cipal case at 840 [citing Board of Trustees of University of llinois v. United States, 
289 U.S. 48 (1933)]. 
It should be noted that even accepting the application of the FLSA to these state 
activities, public schools and hospitals may be "ultimate consumers" within the 
statutory definition of "goods," and therefore excluded from the FLSA's provisions. 29 
U.S.C. § 203(i) (Supp. II, 1967). Under this theory, which was asserted by Maryland 
and Texas in the district court, the public hospitals and schools of the states are the 
ultimate consumers of all materials, supplies, and equipment utilized in their opera-
tions. Their employees, as employees of an ultimate consumer, would not be covered 
since by definition "goods" do not include goods after their delivery to the ultimate 
consumer. See Brief for Plaintiff State of Maryland at 58-66; Brief for Plaintiff State 
of Texas at 31-33; Jurisdictional Statement in the United States Supreme Court at 
35-37, 40-42. Since this argument is one of statutory construction, the district court, 
in confining itself to the constitutional issue, held that it would be more properly 
asserted in a suit involving the application of the FLSA to an individual school or 
enterprise. Principal case at 831. This issue is being included in the appeal being 
taken by the states to the Supreme Court. 
40. See, e.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); California v. United States, 
320 U.S. 577 (1944); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In United States v. 
California, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the power to regu-
late state activities under the commerce clause depends upon whether those activities 
are governmental or proprietary in nature. 297 U.S. at 183. 
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plenary nature of the commerce power thus should not be used to 
sustain automatically a direct regulation of activities undertaken 
by the states, but rather should entail consideration of the practical 
effects which the federal regulation would have upon the operation 
of state govemments.41 Both of these judges agreed that the com-
merce power, rather than being absolute, is subject to a limitation 
similar to that applied to the federal taxing power, which is limited 
to the extent that it "unduly interferes" with a state's performance 
of its sovereign functions.42 
Any conclusion that the commerce power is inherently limited 
must distinguish a number of past cases which have held that state 
activities can indeed be subject to federal commerce clause regu-
lation.43 The two judges in the principal case who put forth the 
inherent limitation theory merely dismissed these strong precedents 
with the observation that "in none of those cases were the essential 
taxing and budgetary functions so seriously affected as by the statute 
under consideration" in this case.44 Closer scrutiny of those cases 
presents a clearer and more meaningful distinction. This distinction 
rests upon the notion that the commerce clause is not a source of 
undifferentiated power applicable to any given state activity which 
41. See note 34 supra. 
42. Id. 
43. The cases upholding federal commerce clause regulation of certain state activ-
ities are Parden v. Terminal R.R. of Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (state 
operating a railroad in interstate commerce held liable to suit under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (Federal Railway 
Labor Act held applicable to a state in its capacity as railroad employer engaged in the 
operation of a belt-line railroad even though congressional policy of promoting col-
lective bargaining conflicted with the state's civil service laws); California v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944) (order of the Federal Maritime Commission directing a 
state and a municipality to limit free wharfage time and to observe prescribed mini-
mum prices for their services in operating waterfront terminals upheld); United States 
v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (holding that the state by engaging in interstate 
commerce by rail subjected itself to the requirements of the Federal Safety Appliance 
Act so as to be liable for penalties for statutory violations); Board of Trustees of 
University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (imposition of a federal 
customs duty on scientific apparatus imported by a state university for educational 
purposes upheld as a valid exercise of Congress' "plenary and exclusive" power to 
regulate foreign commerce); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (state 
sanitary district enjoined from diverting water from Lake Michigan in excess of that 
authorized by the Secretary of War under a statute prohibiting alterations and 
obstructions in the navigable capacity of the Great Lakes waters). 
In a more recent case, United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966), rev'g per curiam 
354 F.2d 549 (1965), a state was held liable to the United States for penalties under 
the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act for growing wheat on state-owned prison farms 
in excess of federally imposed acreage allotments. This decision is distinguishable 
from the cases above in that the federal statute that was applied to the state activity 
did not concern control of an instrumentality of commerce. For a fuller discussion, 
see text accompanying notes 60 and 61 infra. See also Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 
· (1946), a case arising under the war power, where a state was enjoined from selling 
school-land timber at prices in excess of the maximum price prescribed by the OPA 
under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act. 
44. Principal case at 848. 
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may come within its ambit; rather, it should be considered a hybrid 
power containing both a plenary and a nonplenary component.415 
Thus, there are areas which demand a plenary exercise of power 
in order to effectuate a constitutional objective requiring a unified 
national perspective, but there are also areas where the permissible 
extent of federal power over state activities is limited by the consti-
tutionally recognized sovereignty and integrity of the states.46 
Although this dual aspect of the commerce power has never 
been explicitly enunciated, it seems to be entirely in keeping with 
prior cases decided under the commerce clause. The plenary aspect 
of Congress' power to control commerce can best be seen in cases 
upholding the validity of federal regulation of states and their polit-
ical subdivisions in the area of foreign commerce. United action in 
the field of foreign commerce was undeniably one of the prime rea-
sons for the establishment of a strong national government.47 Thus, 
it has been recognized that in problems of international relations 
a principle of federalism is not operative;48 rather, a federal, instead 
of a state, perspective is constitutionally required so that a necessarily 
national policy applicable to the country as a whole can be estab-
lished.49 In this respect, then, the commerce power is "plenary" and 
may be exercised to control state as well as private activities irre-
spective of the sovereign character of the states, just as the federal 
government's war and treaty powers are exercised.50 
In like manner, there seem to be classes of interstate commerce 
45. But see 2 J. STORY, COMMENT.ARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1067-68 (5th ed. 
1891) (suggesting that the commerce clause grants a power that is a "uniform whole'1, 
46. This analytical framework is suggested by the following passage from Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, at 194-95 (1824): 
The genius and character of the whole government seems to be that its action 
is to be applied to all external concerns which affect the states generally; but not 
to those which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect the 
states generally, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose 
of executing some of the general powers of the government. 
47. See, e.g., 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 1058: 
Those who felt the injury arising from • • • [the oppressed and degraded state 
of commerce prior to the adoption of the Constitution] ••• perceived the neces-
sity of giving the control over this important subject to a single government. 
It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise, that the grant should be as extensive 
as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce . . • • 
48. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States 289 U.S. 48 (1933), 
where the Court held that the principle of state immunity has no application to 
duties imposed on the exercise of the power to regulate foreign commerce. 
49. Id. at 59: "In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse 
and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified 
and adequate national power." (Emphasis added.) See Johnson, When the Importer Is 
a State University, May the Government Collect a Duty?, 27 MICH. L. R.Ev. 499 (1929). 
See also Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (holding that the Attorney 
General of the United States could secure an injunction against the Sanitary District 
of Chicago to prevent it from obstructing foreign and interstate commerce by diverting 
a volume of water from Lake Michigan in excess of that allowed by federal statute). 
50. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 
405 (1925). 
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problems as to which the Constitution requires that the federal gov-
ernment have plenary power to formulate a rule applicable to the 
country as a whole.151 One such class seems to be the control of the 
highways and instrumentalities of commerce. Here, the objective 
which justifies federal supremacy through an exercise of a plenary 
commerce power without regard to state sovereignty is maintenance 
of the free movement of goods, an objective which can be achieved 
in the context of conflicting state interests only by a paramount 
federal power.112 In fact, it is in this area of interstate commerce that 
the courts have always upheld federal regulation of state-owned and 
-operated facilities. Thus, state-run railroads, port facilities, and the 
like have been held subject to federal regulation under the com-
merce clause.113 This objective is not merely one of national legis-
lative policy, but involves a "prime purpose" for which the federal 
government was created. 54 
In contrast to this plenary aspect, there seems to be an area of 
interstate commerce in which a complete federal power is neither 
constitutionally commanded nor constitutionally contemplated.55 
51. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946), where the Court talked of a 
"prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment." The commerce power 
itself was granted in order to vest the federal government with the power to deal 
with the chaotic condition of American domestic trade under the Articles of Con-
federation and embodies a constitutional objective of eliminating "the mutual jeal-
ousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic 
retaliation." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1934). See also Polar Ice Cream &: 
Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 378 (1964); 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 1066. 
52. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. &: Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (hold-
ing federal control over intrastate railroad rates essential to maintaining an adequate 
national railway system). See also Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911); 
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1 (1824). A broad range of federal statutes dealing with the actual channels of inter-
state commerce have been enacted by Congress in order to effectuate this constitu-
tutional purpose. See, e.g., Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-25r (1964) 
(transmission and sale of electric energy); Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w 
(transportation and sale of natural gas) (1964); Motor Carrier Act of 1939 (now Part 
II of Interstate Commerce Act) 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964) (motor carriers); Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1964) (water carriers); Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964) (air carriers). 
53. E.g., Parden v. Terminal R.R. of Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964); 
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957); California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 
(1944); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). (See abstracts of these cases 
in note 43 supra). Other types of cases included in this category of commerce are 
those dealing with the navigable waterways which interfere with but do not directly 
regulate state activities. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (holding 
constitutional a federal act authorizing the construction of a dam on nonnavigable 
waters that would flood state-owned land used for schools, a prison farm, and highways 
and bridges and would interfere with the state's own program of water development 
and conservation). 
54. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1964). See note 51 supra. 
55. At times it has been suggested in dicta that the scope of Congress' power to 
regulate interstate commerce is not as broad as the power to control foreign commerce. 
Thus, the dissenting opinion in the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 373-74 (1903) stated: 
It is argued that the power to regulate commerce among the several States is the 
same as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and with the Indian 
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This area would seem to include congressional regulation of activi-
ties which merely "affect" commerce, as opposed to the regulation of 
activities concerned with the actual transportation of goods across 
state lines-that is, the regulation of activities which "affect" com-
merce, as opposed to the regulation of activities which are commerce. 
Examples of the types of activity in this area of commerce are labor 
disputes and the maintenance of substandard labor conditions, both 
of which Congress has found to interfere with or burden the free 
flow of goods in commerce. 56 Yet, in both cases, the finding of inter-
ference with interstate commerce merely served as the basis to 
support social legislation which was not necessarily related to com-
merce clause objectives. In other words, the element of constitu-
tional objective is purely incidental, if not fictitious, and is utilized 
only to justify the legislation constitutionally; the furtherance of 
legislative social policy is the paramount objective. The issue in the 
principal case appears to be of this type, since it does not involve 
the need for unfettered operation of instrumentalities of commerce57 
or any other such matter of constitutional purpose, but rather en-
tails a legislative policy against substandard labor conditions and 
Congress' attempt to deal with these conditions under the aegis of 
the commerce clause. This element of legislative policy, rather than 
constitutional objective, serves to distinguish the principal case from 
previous cases subjecting states to federal regulation under the com-
merce clause and indeed seems to distinguish the nonplenary aspect 
of the power over interstate commerce from its plenary aspect. 58 
tribes. But is its scope the same? ••. [T]he power to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations and the power to regulate interstate commerce, are to be taken diverso 
intuitu, for the latter was intended to secure quality and freedom in commercial 
intercourse as between the States, not to permit the creation of impediments to 
such intercourse; while the former clothed Congress with that power over inter-
national commerce, pertaining to a sovereign nation in its intercourse with for• 
eign nations, and subject, generally speaking, to no implied or reserved power 
in the States. The laws which would be necessary and proper in the one case, 
would not be necessary or proper in the other. 
See also Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 222 (1915). However, there have also been 
dicta to the contrary: that the interstate aspect of Congress' power to control commerce 
is as plenary as its foreign commerce power. See, e.g., License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 
504, 578 (1874); Pittsburgh &: C. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895). Treat-
ing the interstate commerce power as a hybrid as suggested in the text would, of 
course, accommodate both views. See generally LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRE• 
TATION 155-57 (1964). 
56. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964); Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1964). See note 38 supra. 
57. See note 2 supra. 
58. This distinction is suggested by the following passage from THE FEDERALIST 
No. 31, at 199 (H. Dawson ed. 1863) (Hamilton): 
[A]s the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, 
the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they 
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United 
States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, 
wonld exist only in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted 
an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an au-
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Although it is well-recognized that the federal government has 
power to regulate private activities which "affect" commerce,59 no 
case has held that state activities can be constitutionally regulated 
in a like manner. One decision, United States v. Ohio,60 has held 
an activity of a state government amenable to a federal statute en-
acted under the commerce clause merely because that activity "af-
fected commerce." This case, however, did not raise the basic issue 
of whether such an act could constitutionally be applied to a state, 
but merely decided that the state activity came within the statute's 
jurisdictional standard.61 Thus, there is no authority for the prop-
osition that, as a matter of constitutional law, activities of state gov-
ernments which do not directly involve the operation of an instru-
mentality of commerce, but which merely "affect" commerce, are 
amenable to federal regulation under the commerce clause. 
Rather than compelling federal supremacy in all such cases, it 
is possible that the Constitution allows for an adjustment of com-
peting federal and state interests with a view to preserving the effec-
tiveness of both governments. Unless the states are to be rendered 
mere administrative units, there must be an intrinsic limitation on 
the commerce power arising from the constitutionally recognized 
identity and sovereignty of the states and from the practical neces-
sities engendered by the existence of two sovereign governments 
within one geographical area.62 Since our federal scheme of govern-
thority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the 
like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar 
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repug-
nant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might 
appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different: I mean 
where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional 
interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply 
any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. [Em-
phasis added] 
The distinction between a constitutional objective and a legislative policy is not 
always easy to make, since the legislative policy and the exercise of power to accom-
plish it may often be justified in terms of constitutional purpose. Thus, the FLSA, 
which expresses a legislative policy against substandard labor conditions and is a 
public welfare measure, is justified in the legislative findings as a measure designed to 
accomplish the constitutional objective of eliminating burdens and obstructions on the 
free flow of goods in commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (Supp. II, 1967). 
59. Congress thus far has been deemed to have exclusive control over private 
activities which affect commerce (see articles cited in note 38 supra), not, however, 
because of a constitutional imperative, but because courts have found no compelling 
reasons to allow a state to control private activities when the federal government has 
acted in the area. 
60. 385 U.S. 9 (1966). 
61. The Agricultural Adjustment Act is intended to apply to wheat producers when 
their wheat could be said to exert a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce. 7 U.S.C. §§ ll!0l(a)(3) &: (4), 1331 (1964). 
62. The expansion of the federal commerce power since the 1930's has caused some 
commentators to wonder whether there is any limit to the power which the federal 
government can exercise under the aegis of the commerce clause and whether the 
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ment necessarily implies restrictions on the exercise ol: all govern-
mental power so as to preserve the integrity of its constituent units, 
it would seem that the commerce power, perhaps like the taxing 
power, 63 should be limited so that it cannot be utilized to destroy 
state sovereignty. This notion of inherent limitation is in accord 
with the principle of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment. 
While the tenth amendment may not operate as an affirmative limi-
tation upon federal power, it must at least guarantee tl:.e continued 
vitality of the states as governmental units in a federal scheme if it 
is to have any meaning at all. 64 Although such a limitation has yet 
states can retain their vitality in the face of such power. See generally L. VvHITE, THE 
STATES AND THE NATION (1953); Crampton, The Supreme Court and the Decline of 
State Power, 2 J. LAw &: EcoN. 175 (1959); Cudlip, The Function oJ the States, 43 
MICH. L. REY. 95 (1944); Fordham, The States in the Federal System--Vital Role or 
Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REY. 666 (1963); Light, The Federal Commerce Pc•wer, 49 VA. L. 
REY. 717 (1963). In fact, the fear that Congress was deliberately dimgarding its au-
thority under the Constitution was early voiced by Woodrow WIison: 
The old theory of the sovereignty of the States • • . has lost its Yitality • • • • 
[T]he federal government is, through its courts, the final judge of its own powers 
• • . • Its power is "to regulate commerce between the States," and the attempts 
now made during every session of Congress to carry the implications of that 
power beyond the utmost boundaries of reasonable and honest ir ference show 
that the only limits likely to be observed by the politicians are these set by the 
good sense and conservative temper of the country. 
W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 178-79 (1908). The 
precise role to be played by the states is not important for present purposes. What is 
noteworthy is that the fact that there are areas of peculiarly local concern which the 
Constitution leaves to the states has been recognized as a limitation 1lpon the unre-
stricted exercise of the commerce power, even in those cases which hl.ve contributed 
significantly to the expansion of that power. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill 
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &: Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In the last mentioned case the essential probkm presented to 
the Court was that of defining those private activities which are within the reach of 
the federal commerce power and those which are of purely local concern and which 
must be left to state regulation. It was in this context that the substantial effect test 
developed and not in the context of cases dealing with the issue of which state activi-
ties may be constitutionally subjected to an exercise of federal power. See note 38 
supra. 
63. At least one commentator has suggested that this idea serves as a basis for mak-
ing an analogy between the taxing power and the commerce power. Professor Charles 
L. Black in PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 25, 30 (1963) states: 
The Federal powers-over commerce, taxation, the post, the armed forces, the 
currency, patents and copyrights, maritime affairs, and so on-can be used to co-
erce any result concerning any matter, however "local," unless an implied limita-
tion (on Federal authority) exists, and the concept of a legally defined Federalism, 
judicially implied, has then no substance •.•• 
The issue, rather, is whether the Federal system has any legal substance, any core 
of constitutional right that the courts will enforce. 
If it has not, but exists only at the sufference of Congress, that cardinal fact 
should be recognized. The only viable alternative is the working out of a body of 
doctrine stating limitations on Congress that are implied from the existence and 
authority of the states. 
64. The constitutional recognition of state governments does not mean that the 
tenth amendment is to be viewed as an affirmative limitation on the powers of the 
federal government. Such a view has been rejected consistently since the late 1930's. 
Probably the most notable decision on this point is United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 123 (1941), in which the Supreme Court dismissed the tenth amendment as "but 
a truism-that all is retained that has not been surrendered." 
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to be placed upon the commerce power by any court, it would seem 
to be supported by the statement of Justice Frankfurter in his opinion 
in New York v. United States,65 to the effect that "the power of 
Congress to lay taxes has impliedly no less a reach than the power 
of Congress to regulate commerce."66 The suggestion that in some 
respects the commerce power is coextensive with the taxing power 
may indicate that the commerce power should be similarly limited 
when its exercise upon the states has an impairing effect akin to that 
which results from an exercise of the taxing power. 
The basic issue in the principal case thus resolves itself into a 
problem of defining those state activities which may be constitu-
tionally regulated and those which may not. Analogizing to the test 
under the taxing power, the appropriate test for determining which 
state activities are regulable should consider the degree of impair-
ment of state functions resulting from an exercise of the commerce 
power upon the states.67 This test is similar to the one suggested by 
The tenth amendment does, however, buttress the argument for implying a prin-
ciple of intergovernmental immunity inasmuch as it expressly declares what the seven 
basic articles of the Constitution imply, namely, that the system of government they 
establish was intended to preserve the integrity of the states and protect a certain 
field of autonomy against federal encroachment. See United States v. Baltimore & 
O.R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 327-28 (1873) [quoted with approval by Justices Douglas 
and Black, dissenting in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, at 593 (1946)]: 
The right of the states to administer their own affairs through their legislative, 
executive, and judicial departments, in their own manner through their own 
agencies, is conceded by the uniform decisions of this court and by the practice of 
the Federal government from its organization. • . • Their operation may be im-
peded and may be destroyed, if any interference is permitted. 
See also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868): 
The preservation of the states and the maintenance of their governments are as 
much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the 
Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all 
its provisions, looks to an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states. 
65. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). 
66. Id. at 582. 
67. Analogies to the taxing power cannot be readily dismissed by reference to broad 
language in some opinions to the effect that the principle of intergovernmental im-
munity cannot operate as a limitation upon the power to regulate commerce. See, e.g., 
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Cases in which such statements have 
been made are distinguishable from the principal case. See notes 43-58 supra and 
accompanying text. If some constitutional principle limits the federal government's 
power to interfere with the sovereign functions of the states, that limitation, it would 
seem, must apply with equal force to an exercise of the commerce power. All of Con-
gress' powers are granted by the same section of the Constitution. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, 
§ 8. Thus, there would seem that limitations on one power which are derived from 
other provisions of the Constitution not specifically limited to that power should 
similarly restrict all Congress' powers. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improve-
ment Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), where the Court, in comparing the bankruptcy 
power to the taxing power, stated at 530: "Both [powers] are granted by the same 
section of the Constitution, and we find no reason for saying that one is impliedly 
limited by the necessity of preserving independence of the States, while the other is 
not." See also Note, State Sovereignty as a Limitation Upon the Federal Commerce 
Power, 45 YALE L.J. 1118 (1936). 
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Chief Justice Stone in New York v. United States as determinative 
of the amenability of state activities to federal taxation, the basic 
inquiry of which was whether the imposition of a nondiscriminatory 
tax results in "a State ... being taxed so as unduly to infringe, in 
some manner, the performance of its functions as a government 
which the Constitution recognizes as sovereign."68 The concurring 
and dissenting judges in the principal case utilized a similar notion 
in asserting that the appropriate test for determining: the permis-
sibility of an exercise of the commerce power upon the states should 
involve a balancing of the extent of interference with :indispensable 
state functions against the effect that such functions have upon inter-
state commerce.69 
Application of an "undue interference test," similar to the one 
suggested in the taxing power cases, 70 to the facts of the principal 
case perhaps best demonstrates the necessity of implying a limitation 
on the power over interstate commerce and illustrates the way in 
which such a test would operate as a balancing device to resolve 
the conflict of sovereignties resulting from an exercise of the federal 
commerce power upon state activities. In determining the amena-
bility of state-operated schools and hospitals to federal wage and 
hour regulation, the possible frustration of federal wage and hour 
policy arising from failure to regulate these activities s;1ould be bal-
anced against the impact which application of the FLSA will have 
upon the states. In assessing the extent of the frustration of federal 
goals, it is necessary to consider the significance of the federal regu-
68. 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946). Later in his opinion Chief Justice Stone reiterated 
language he had previously used in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 
(1926): 
[T]he limitation upon the trucing power of each [the states and the federal govern-
ment], so far as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which 
permits both to function with the minimum of interference with the other; and 
that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as seriously to impair either the 
trucing power of the government imposing the tax ••• or the appropriate exercise 
of the functions of the government affected by it. 
For earlier formulations of the idea of permitting both governments to function "with 
a minimum of interference," see Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keffe, 306 U.S. 466 
(1939); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Wilcutts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 
(1931); cases cited in note 70 infra. 
69. Chief Judge Thomsen, concurring, phrased the applicable test as follows: "The 
attempted exercise against a State of the power of the federal government over inter-
state commerce should face the test: does it interfere unduly with the State's perfor-
mance of its sovereign and indispensable functions of government? If the concept of 
federalism is to survive, it must stand on constitutional limitations, not on the suf-
ferance of the federal government." Principal case at 849. Judge Norlhrop stated that 
the test should be similar to the one suggested in Chief Justice Stone's opinion in 
New York v. United States: "The question before us is whether this Congressional 
exercise of power under the Commerce Clause constitutes an undue infringement upon 
the 'performance of [the state's] function as a government which the Constitution rec-
ognizes as sovereign.' " Principal case at 853. 
70. E.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Helvering v. Powers, 293 
U.S. 214 (1934); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 369 (1934); Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 
514 (1926). See also note 68 supra. 
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Iatory activities being attacked in relation to Congress' over-all 
scheme of regulation and to ascertain whether alternative means of 
achieving the same goals are available. Under the FLSA, Congress 
has succeeded in regulating about 30 million of the 60 million wage 
and salary workers in the United States. The 1966 amendments ex-
panded this coverage, but included only some 1.4 million public 
employees, many of whom are already receiving a wage at or above 
the minimum wage prescribed by the Act.71 Moreover, Congress has 
alternative means of securing its objective of a minimum wage for 
public employees: a scheme of conditional grants. Thus, the poten-
tial frustration of the federal minimum wage policy is minimal. On 
the other side of the scale, a literal application of the statute72 with 
increases in wages for covered employees, threatens to impose sub-
stantial and perhaps destructive financial burdens upon already 
strained state budgets.73 For most states to meet these added costs, 
it will be necessary for them either to curtail indispensable services 
now being provided74 or to increase taxes, an alternative which, 
71. See note 32 supra. 
72. Opinions of the Wage-Hour Administrator indicate that the 1966 amendments 
will be literally applied once their validity has been upheld. See CCH LAB. L. REP. 
(2 WAGES &: HOURS} 111J 30,004, 30,006, 30,647 (1967). 
73. It is estimated that a total of some $215 million in additional funds would be 
needed to cover the increased expenses in the first year above. Brief of Plaintiff State 
of Maryland at 5. Texas alleged that to meet the standards imposed by the FLSA, the 
expenses of the Texas Youth Council would have to be increased S3 million annually; 
the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation would require $7.5 million 
more per year; institutions of higher learning would have additional costs of over 
$3.25 million imposed on them annually; and the Fort Worth Independent School 
District, which is merely one of 1,300 other Texas School Districts, would need addi-
tional tax revenues of $575,000 annually by 1971. Furthermore, some of these districts 
have already reached their constitutional tax rates and property value limitations. 
Brief for the State of Texas at 18; principal case at 851. 
74. "Indispensable" as used here is not intended to be a mere euphemism for what 
was formerly called an "essential" state function or a "governmental" function, but is 
meant to cover state activities which cannot reasonably be supplied to the general 
public unless the state undertakes them. For example, a substantial portion of avail-
able hospital facilities and care would probably be unavailable unless supplied by 
the states. In Maryland, for example, state-provided beds constitute the only facilities 
available for tubercular care in the state. Similarly, 90% of the facilities for the 
mentally ill and defective in Maryland are provided by the state. In Texas non-
state hospital beds are virtually nonexistent and the few private facilities that do 
exist arc extremely expensive. Similar conditions exist in other states. The primary 
role played by the states in the area of education, of course, is well recognized. In 
Maryland, Texas, and Ohio over 80% of the total number of secondary and elementary 
school pupils are enrolled in public schools. Public institutions of higher education 
serve 74% of the students enrolled in degree programs in Maryland, 77% in Texas, and 
63% in Ohio. See principal case at 850. It should also be noted that public institutions 
bear the main burden of caring for the indigent. These facts indicate the vital role that 
the states play in providing needed facilities and services in response to the desires of 
their citizens, a role which may become too burdensome when the federal government 
is allowed to regulate a large portion of the costs of such activities. What has been said 
in respect to schools and hospitals applies, of course, with equal force to the "related 
institutions" covered by the 1966 amendments. 
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even if politically feasible, may often be impossible since many of 
the political subdivisions involved are already saddled with sizeable 
debts and are taxing at their constitutional maximum.s.75 
Also significant is the nature of the state activities being brought 
within the ambit of congressional regulation. Certainly the propriety 
of regulating activities involving the actual functioning of a state 
government, including the provision of indispensable public services 
of such an economically marginal nature that they would not other-
wise be provided, is highly questionable.76 Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that there are special considerations where the federal govern-
ment endeavors to exercise its power upon activities involving the 
functioning of a "State as a State."77 It should here he noted that 
the distinction suggested between regulable and nonregulable state 
activities does not rest upon the unworkable and discredited distinc-
tion between "governmental" and "proprietary" functi-::ms78 or upon 
arbitrary classifications of state activities on the basis of whether 
they are deemed "essential" or "nonessential."79 Rather, it rests 
upon whether the state activity contributes to the public health, 
safety, and welfare and would not othenvise be provided were the 
state to curtail its activities.80 
75. See principal case at 851; Brief for Plaintiff State of Texas a1: 18. 
76. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 593-94 (1946), where Justices Doug-
las and Black observed in dissent: 
Many state activities are in marginal enterprises where private capital refuses to 
venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal tax and the social program 
may be destroyed before it can be launched. In any case, the reperc.ussions of such 
a fundamental change on the credit of the States and on their p1ograms to take 
care of the needy and to build for the future would be considerable. 
See note 74 supra. 
77. 326 U.S. at 582. 
78. This approach was discredited in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 
(1946), where Chief Justice Stone noted that he regarded "as untenable the distinction 
between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' interest •.•• " Early taxing power cases had 
used the distinction between governmental and proprietary activities in determining 
the amenability of state activities to federal taxation. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents, 304 
U.S. 439, 453 (1938); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 225, 227 (1934). See also Annots., 
163 A.L.R. 542 (1946); 155 A.L.R. 423 (1945). 
79. The essential-nonessential approach has been rejected by the Supreme Court in 
several cases. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946), where the Court, in 
rejecting the state's contention that the Emergency Price Control A:t interferes with 
the state's performance of an "essential governmental function-the education of its 
citizens," said: "[T]he petitioner's argument is that the extent of [t1e war] power as 
applied to state functions depends on whether these are 'essential' to the state govern-
ment. The use of the same criterion in measuring the Constitution:11 power of Con-
gress to tax has proved to be unworkable, and we reject it as a guide in the field here 
involved." The contention that the state activity involved was "essential" was likewise 
rejected in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Even if the distinctions 
between governmental and proprietary interests and essential and nonessential activi-
ties are helpful insofar as they provide a guide based on past preced,mt, the operation 
of both schools and hospitals has long been regarded as "governmental" in nature and 
"essential" to the public health, safety, and welfare. See cases collected ISA WoRDs &: 
PHRASES 283-86, 297 (1956). 
80. See note 74 supra. See generally the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in 
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 590. 
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Finally, there is the argument that a state by engaging in a par-
ticular activity has somehow "subjected itself to [the commerce] 
power."81 Thus, if a state were to engage in commercial activities in 
competition with private concerns, or if it undertook the operation 
of instrumentalities of commerce for the private advantage of the 
state and its residents, 82 it would be deemed to be "in commerce" 
just as private persons would be were they to engage in such activ-
ities. Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that where a state ac-
tually competes with private enterprise, it is difficult to argue that 
its activity is "indispensable" since even in the absence of state action 
the service would be provided by private concerns. Moreover, if the 
state were not subject to the federal regulation it might gain an 
unfair advantage over its private competitors. It is not easy to see, 
however, how the states in operating schools and hospitals have 
somehow purposely engaged in commerce. Rather, the effect that 
they exert upon interstate commerce arises only as a necessary inci-
dent to the performance of functions which are basically noncom-
mercial in nature and essential to the health and welfare of local 
residents.83 
Weighing all of these factors, it appears that the issue in the 
principal case should be resolved in favor of the states. The 1966 
amendments interfere with the states in operating public schools 
and hospitals to a degree not justified by the need to effectuate 
the congressional objective of eliminating substandard labor condi-
tions throughout the country. 
81. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957). The Court held as follows: "If 
California, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, subjects itself to the commerce 
power so that Congress can make it conform to federal safety requirements, it has also 
subjected itself to that power so that Congress can regulate its employment relation• 
ships." See also Parden v. Terminal R.R. Alabama Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964); 
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946); United States v. California, 297 
U.S. 175 (1936). 
82. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 580 (1944) ("In thus providing 
facilities for waterborne traffic, Oakland and California have for many years competed 
with privately-owned terminals in San Francisco Bay."); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 
361, 369 (1934) ("When a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests 
itself of its quasi-sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader •••• "). 
83. Lierberthal v. North County Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (1964) (citing cases hold-
ing that the incidental flow of supplies in interstate commerce does not in itself suf-
fice to transform an essentially intrastate activity into an interstate enterprise). It 
would seem that the use of goods originating out of the state is merely incidental to-
indeed often necessarily incidental to-the various state agencies carrying out their 
official governmental duties. See notes 37 and 38 supra and accompanying text. 
